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Abstract 
What keeps corruption in check? Politicians have incentives to both avoid and actively 
oppose corruption when voters can hold them accountable for it. But to punish 
malfeasance voters have to know about it, and corrupt actors don’t want such 
information to be easy to find. Moreover, we argue that the very people best positioned 
to observe and block corruption—legislators with influence in the policy-making 
process—are also well-positioned to benefit from corruption. We thus focus on political 
elites and explore the conditions affecting the corrupt exercise of influence in the 
policy-making process. To that end, we look at the role of institutional checks in the 
legislative process and conclude, contra conventional wisdom, that as the number of 
checks increase so also should corruption increase, all else equal. This conclusion 
follows from the argument that checks give the individuals who control them influence 
and, importantly, an incentive to collude with other veto players in order to channel 
public resources to private ends. As long as the benefits of collusion (e.g., among 
coalition partners or even copartisans) outweigh the costs, increasing the number and 
potency of checks only increases opportunities for corruption. We find, testing our 
claim against data from a sample of 97 countries, strong support for our hypothesized 
relationship between institutional checks and corruption. 
Key words Veto players, checks, corruption, governance, panel data 
JEL classification D72, D73  
Introduction 
Most analyses of the causes of corruption start with the presumption that corruption, or 
the abuse of public office for private gain, grows from voters’ inability to rein in their 
representatives. In the face of government malfeasance, scholars ask whether and how 
political institutions can remove or at least ameliorate its causes.
1
 Answers in the 
literature vary in specifics, often in contradictory ways, but generally boil down to a 
statement that corruption is lowest where political institutions, primarily electoral rules, 
give voters the wherewithal to punish politicians who fail to perform to expectations.
2
 
We take a somewhat different tack. While not denying the importance of the electoral 
connection between voters and representatives, we focus on the incentives facing 
legislative actors. The reasons we do so are two. First, in order for voters or anybody 
else to punish malfeasance, they have to both know that it exists and be able to identify 
its source. As with any activity that invites punishment if brought to light, however, 
those involved want to keep it hidden. Consequently, the only people who can be 
counted on consistently to know about it are those involved in the policy-making 
processes that make it possible. Even the most hard-working investigative reporter 
needs leaks and leads, for instance, and if neither is forthcoming the information will 
remain hidden no matter how free the media are. Second, even legislative elites who 
know of others’ bad behavior might not have any reason to reveal it. Indeed, and this is 
where we part from the existing literature, elites sometimes not only might be willing to 
tolerate others’ bad behavior, but also to use their legislative influence to behave badly 
themselves. 
We ask three questions. Who is likely to be in a position to observe malfeasance? Who, 
having observed malfeasance, is in a position to do something about it? And what 
incentives do those who observe bad behavior have to act? The answer to the first 
question is straightforward: the people best situated to know that policy makers or their 
agents are behaving badly are other participants in the policy process. The answer to the 
second question is those who can influence outcomes—i.e., individuals with the ability 
to propose, amend, or block legislation. These latter actors both have the most at stake 
in outcomes (that reflect on them) and possess the resources to block or at least impede 
corrupt elements in the legislative process.  
The answer to the third question is more context-specific. When a legislator observes 
corruption, what should she do? If it is costly to her or if making it public gives her an 
advantage, she can reveal it to others (e.g., voters) in a position to impose some kind of 
punishment or she can use her own authority to nip it in the bud. The presence of actors 
                                                          
1
 Rose-Ackerman (1975) gets the ball rolling from a theoretical perspective while La Porta et al. 
(1999) do so from an empirical one. For reviews of the literature see Lambsdorff (2007) and 
Treisman (2007).  
2
 For example, Montinola and Jackman (2002), Bäck and Hadenius (2008) and Charron and 
Lapuente (2010) have looked at how the level of democracy affects this principal-agent problem 
while Panizza (2001), Persson et al. (2003), Chang (2005), Kunicovà and Rose-Ackerman 
(2005) and Chang and Golden (2006) examine how electoral rules affect how accountable 
political candidates are to voters.  
positioned to know about malfeasance and with incentives to do something about it 
(rendering it either pointless or detrimental) should motivate potential malefactors to toe 
the legal line. A witness to corruption who would gain nothing from opposing it, by 
contrast, can ignore (i.e., tolerate) it; or she can her own authority, not to block 
corruption but rather to contribute to it by funneling resources to her own ends. Put 
simply, elites with opposing policy preferences such that one’s policy gain implies the 
other’s policy loss should do all they can to block each other on policy and anything 
else. The more elites share policy preferences, however, the more they should be willing 
to tolerate each other’s foibles in the interest of achieving common goals.  
The key institutional feature of our argument is legislative checks—in a word, the 
formal authority to delay, block, or amend bills. Vetoes, by providing influence over 
outcomes, inject those who control them into legislative process (Tsebelis 1995; 2002). 
We test our argument, which hinges on the assertion that checks not only exist but also 
function independently from partisan concerns, using a new measure of legislative 
checks that focuses solely on formal legislative and constitutional rules (*** 2013). This 
indicator both counts the number of formal checks and provides contextual information 
on the extent to which these checks can be weakened (as is the case for example, when 
the legislature can remove the executive from office or when the executive can dissolve 
the legislature). Our expectation is that, controlling for the effect of partisan 
preferences, the stronger the formal checks in place, the more corruption since checks 
empower veto players to use their leverage for private gain. Our empirical results, 
drawn from a sample of up to 97 countries from 1984 to 2005, provide strong support 
for this expectation even after accounting for a range of potentially important covariates 
and applying a host of robustness checks.   
We structure the paper as follows. In the following section we develop our argument 
linking formal checks with corruption and point to gaps in current empirical work 
relating checks to governance. Next, we describe our key data and the empirical 
method. We then present and discuss our main empirical results and robustness checks. 
We conclude with a summary of key findings.  
Institutional checks and individual self-interest 
Research on corruption typically focuses on voters’ ability to control their elected 
representatives. The ability to keep agents in check, however, is meaningless absent 
information about whom to check and when. Moreover, because powerful and corrupt 
agents might be able to keep their perfidy hidden, a more reliable foundation for good 
government requires that those who would like to see corrupt actors punished—e.g., 
political rivals—be in a position both to observe and report undesirable behavior and, 
ideally, to block it (Brown el al. 2011). These two elements—effective monitoring and 
institutional incentives—are fundamental to well-designed principal-agent relationships 
(Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). 
Effective monitoring and institutions are vital, but they are difficult to find together. 
First, in order to be in a position to observe and report wrongdoing, whether willful or a 
product of error or incompetence, a person has to be involved in the process where bad 
behavior can be observed. The best vantage point is within the legislature. The 
legislative process, from bill proposal to final passage, incorporates checks; the degree 
to which actors who control those checks, which in most legislatures implies being a 
member of the governing coalition, share an interest in holding on to power should 
affect their willingness to reveal whatever malfeasance they see.  
Our argument begins with the basic assumption that political actors care about policy, 
but not to the exclusion of other uses for legislative resources (cf. Müller and Strøm 
1999; Strøm 1990), e.g., personal enrichment or funneling public resources to friendly 
private interests. When the policy preferences of actors who control legislative checks 
diverge, none has any reason to let others achieve their policy or non-policy goals. 
When their preferences converge, by contrast, they benefit in policy terms from each 
other’s control over checks. Realizing policy goals is not an issue because it is not 
problematic, so veto players can leverage their power to delay or amend bills in order to 
extract resources for non-policy ends. Inasmuch as blocking or revealing malfeasance 
on the part of policy allies would involve both blocking desired policy and risking the 
survival of the ruling majority, turning a blind eye to corruption seems a small price to 
pay for legislative control. The implication is that formal institutional checks in the 
absence of partisan or programmatic concerns should, all else equal, increase the 
incidence of malfeasance (see Diermeier and Myerson 1999 with respect to the creation 
of legislative “hurdles” as a means to extract resources from lobbyists). When there are 
few formal checks in place, on the other hand, corruption should be lower since there 
are fewer hands in the till.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that the level of corruption will be higher the greater 
the number of veto players (they call them monopolists), assuming that the veto players 
ignore each other and focus on maximizing their private gains independently (see also 
Brennan and Hamlin 1994). Their veto players are independent public administrators, 
however, decidedly different from actors in the legislative process. Andrews and 
Montinola (2004), by contrast, suggest that increasing the total number of veto players 
(not just in the legislative arena) makes collusion more difficult and reduces actors’ 
capacity to collude to accept bribes, which in turn should reduce corruption. That we 
arrive at the opposite conclusion is neither surprising nor necessarily inconsistent 
because, again, we restrict our analysis to legislative checks while they count all checks 
in a system. Legislating is by nature a collective endeavor, in which independent actors 
get nowhere; but actors who are willing to abide each other’s ethical lapses stand to 
benefit personally. If anything, collusion helps make the collective activity of legislating 
possible. Cooperation should indeed be more difficult outside the legislative arena, as 
Andrews and Montinola show, because extra-legislative veto players (such as courts 
and subnational governments) are both much more easily characterized as independent 
from each other and, importantly, better equipped to accept or reject decisions made in 
the national legislature than to amend their content.  
To reiterate: In order to reveal corruption, one has to observe it. The only guaranteed 
way to observe malfeasance in policy making is to be involved in the policy-making 
process. But even for individuals whose motives and behavior are beyond reproach, 
revealing bad behavior by others is not obviously the best course of action. Whether 
political actors have incentives to reveal any improper use of legislative resources that 
they might see depends on three factors: Do they benefit from it? Does it hurt them (and 
if so, is the cost greater than any benefit)? And will revealing it make them better—or at 
least no worse—off? With respect to the third item, for instance, it is not difficult to find 
examples of corporate and government whistleblowers who were punished for revealing 
wrongdoing. If, for anyone in a position to observe and reveal malfeasance, the benefits 
from it outweigh the costs or actually pulling back the curtain on it would be damaging, 
it is unlikely that anyone else will ever see the evidence. 
We focus on the legislative arena, first because legislators control a state’s resources 
and second because the resources to deal with problems elsewhere are as a rule 
allocated legislatively. Legislators control the resources either to control corruption or to 
add to it. Opportunities for realizing rents from the policy process come from influence 
over the process. Such influence is most obviously rooted in the ability to stop the 
process—in, in other words, legislative checks. The power to block corruption, in a 
word, also implies the power not to block it.  
What about third-party reporting? Members of the political opposition of course would 
like any evidence of misbehavior in government to come to light. Similarly, evidence of 
malfeasance is the kind of news a free press thrives on. But willful malfeasance is hard 
to spot basically by definition: bribes, for example, benefit both those who take them 
and those who offer them, so each has reason not only not to reveal the bribe but 
actively to conceal it. This not to say that evidence of misgovernment always remains 
hidden, but rather that the likelihood that it will surface probably is low. Corruption 
ought to thrive where it is most likely to remain in the shadows. Where it is likely to be 
revealed and consequently punished, by contrast, potentially corrupt actors should 
constrain themselves in order to avoid punishment.
3
 Where corruption exists, it is likely 
to be hidden. Where it is unlikely to remain hidden, it should not exist.  
To be clear: The veto-player logic (Tsebelis 1995; 2002) that underpins our argument 
builds on James Madison’s (1787) statement in Federalist 51 that “Ambition must be 
made to counteract ambition.” When actors’ ambitions diverge, so that policy that 
benefits one hurts the other, they would check each other if they could. This is the 
situation that obtains when partisan checks are enabled by virtue of rival parties’ control 
over separate veto points (see also Persson et al. 1997). When policy is contentious, i.e., 
one actor getting more of what she wants implies that other actors get less of what they 
want, intralegislative competition and behavior revolve around policy objectives. 
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 Similarly, the more likely any kind of malfeasance is to be revealed, the more careful elites 
should be not only to avoid corruption but also to promote competent, careful agents (e.g., 
bureaucrats). 
Legislative actors, whether parties or individuals, focus on the complementary goals of 
enacting their preferred policies and keeping their rivals from doing the same. They do 
so by employing checks.  
Tsebelis (1995; 2002) distinguishes theoretically between institutional checks and 
partisan checks. The former derive from formal rules of procedure that allocate 
authority to specific offices or bodies to block passage of a bill; the latter derive from 
the preferences of those who control those institutional checks. While partisan and 
institutional checks are in principal distinct, Tsebelis’s formulation in practice combines 
them. Partisan checks thus function by virtue of procedure—e.g., in cabinet government 
the ability of any cabinet party to bring the government down by exiting the coalition 
effectively gives every coalition party a veto—or when different parties control 
different institutional checks. Institutional checks are a function of formal authority, but 
only work when operated by actors who want to check each other. Thus, in the original 
formulation, partisan competition activates institutional checks, while partisan checks 
can operate even absent well-defined institutional ones. 
It follows from Tsebelis’s (1995) absorption rule that veto gates (i.e., institutional 
checks) are meaningless when controlled by copartisans or close allies. Multiple 
institutional checks controlled by a single party are counted as one. For example, a 
bicameral legislature where the same party holds a majority in both chambers is counted 
as if it were unicameral. This is problematic because it ignores the preferences and 
incentives of the individuals who operate them. Indeed, the operating assumption is that 
members of a single party hold identical preferences (Laver and Schofield 1990, ch. 2; 
but see cf. Heller 2001; Laver and Shepsle 1990; 1999; VanDusky and Heller 2014). 
But no one who wields power—and controlling vetoes is power—can credibly commit 
to do anything but use that power to her own advantage (see, e.g., Laver and Shepsle 
1996; Osbourne and Slivinski 1996; Shepsle 1979; 1991). We argue that legislative 
checks, which imply at least the ability to delay legislation if not block it outright and 
often include the authority to amend bills, give individuals leverage to make themselves 
better off in the process of passing legislation (Heller 1997; cf. Osbourne and 
Rubinstein 1990; see also Tsebelis and Money 1997).  
When players compete over policy, following veto-player theory and as argued in most 
of the literature, we agree that corruption (and agreement more generally) should be 
rare. Checks give those who control them the ability to protect themselves from 
proposals they dislike and, in the process, stymie their rivals’ ambitions. But we do not 
agree that shared partisanship should render checks inoperative. Where Tsebelis and 
others assume that checks are inoperative unless controlled by rival parties, we argue 
that copartisans or close allies who control checks might use their authority to collude 
both in policy making and in corruption.  Basically, the individuals who operate the 
levers of power—the veto players—cannot and do not set aside their own self-interest 
for the good of their parties. They thus can undermine the quality of governance not 
only by blocking good policy (Gerring and Thacker 2004), but also by letting bad policy 
pass or using their leverage in the process to direct government resources to their own 
ends. This observation straightforwardly yields the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: The number of legislative checks should be positively correlated with 
corruption. 
To test our hypothesis we need a measure of institutional or formal checks as distinct 
from partisan preferences. Ideally, moreover, a measure of checks also should capture 
the “security” of veto players’ authority, as this is likely to affect their capacity to hold 
out for personal gain. Unfortunately, existing empirical work calibrating the impact of 
checks on governance has employed measures of checks which effectively conflate 
formal and partisan checks (for a full discussion see *** 2013). For instance, Panizza 
(2001) uses Henisz’s (2000; 2002) index of legislative checks, POLCON, which 
measures the number of independent branches of government with veto power over 
policy change, the extent of party alignment across branches of government (measured 
as the extent to which the same party or coalition of parties control each branch) and the 
degree of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch (measured as 
legislative fractionalization in the relevant house). This measure collapses to 0 if there 
are no veto points or if they are controlled by a single party, thus operationalizing the 
presumption that checks are irrelevant in such contexts. Based on this indicator, Panizza 
(2001) finds that the presence of veto points controlled by political rivals is associated 
with better governance. Andrews and Montinola (2004) find that more checks lead to 
higher levels of rule of law. To measure checks they rely on the CHECKS variable from 
the Database of Political Institutions or DPI (Beck et al. 2001), an indicator that starts 
off with a value of one for all political regimes (including those that do not hold 
competitive legislative elections) and rises with competitiveness of executive elections, 
the existence of additional legislative chambers, divided government, the number of 
coalition parties or inter-party ideological distance. By its very construction therefore, 
this variable combines both institutional and partisan influences. Finally, Brown et al. 
(2011) account for rival veto points by way of the ideological distance or polarization 
among the largest parties and the executive and find that the partisan divide seems to 
keep corruption under control. Thus, in all cases the measure of veto points or checks is 
defined in terms of partisan competition. This is tantamount to assuming that having 
some number of institutional checks controlled by a single party is equivalent to having 
no checks at all. 
We thus turn to a new measure of checks which accounts for both formal checks and, 
significantly, factors such as the ability to call new elections that might make veto 
players reluctant to use their authority (*** 2013). This measure, which we explain 
more fully in the next section, is invariant with respect to electoral outcomes or 
coalitional composition—i.e., it explicitly ignores Tsebelis’s (1995) partisan veto 
players and absorption rule—capturing formal institutional checks not partisan ones. If 
decisions in a multiparty cabinet required unanimous consent (so that any member of 
cabinet could veto any decision), then our measure would undercount checks. If our 
checks matter even when controlled by a single party, by contrast, other measures 
undercount them. The measure is essentially additive, but weights specific veto (or 
delay) points by their exposure to “censure” authority, i.e., players formally endowed 
with the ability to impose costs on veto players who cross them. The ability of the 
executive to block legislation thus amounts to less when he can be removed from office 
by the legislature, for example, and the ability of the legislature to act against the 
executive’s desires is weakened when the executive unilaterally can call new elections 
(cf. Shugart and Carey 1992). 
Data and empirical approach 
Our measure of formal legislative checks (legchecks) comes from *** (2013). They 
employ the following twelve constitutional-level variables from the Institutions and 
Elections Project (IAEP; Regan, Frank and Clark 2009):  
 
 the number of legislative chambers (legcham); 
 whether an executive (e.g., president or prime minister) has a veto (execveto); 
 whether the legislature can block executive action (legveto); 
 whether the legislature can remove an executive from office (removeexec); 
 whether an executive has the authority to dissolve the legislature (removeleg); 
 whether there is an executive who is chosen independently from the legislature 
(execindep); 
 whether an executive has legislative proposal authority (legpres); 
 whether the prime minister has the authority to propose legislation (legpm; this 
variable obviously is 0 if there is no prime minister); 
 whether (explicitly or by common practice) an executive holds a legislative seat 
(exleg); 
 whether the prime minister has the authority to call elections (callpm); 
 whether the president has the authority to call elections (callpres); 
 or whether no one has the authority to call new elections (callnone), as is the 
case for example in Norway (and presidential countries). 
 
Our approach to aggregating these variables legchecks is as follows (see *** 2013 for 
details). Legcham and callnone are taken to be the two components which contribute 
unqualifiedly towards the strength of legislative checks. The number of legislative 
chambers matters because even weak chambers can affect legislative outcomes. 
Callnone makes it easier for officeholders to put their checking authority to use. 
Alternatively, the impact of the other variables listed above depends on context: 
execveto is weakened in the presence of removeexec; legveto is weakened when either 
the president or the prime minister can call elections (callpres and callpm) and 
disappears entirely if both can; it also is weakened when the executive can dissolve the 
legislature; executive ability to propose legislation (legpres) is weakened when the 
legislature can remove the executive; removeexec provides a check (via threat of 
punishment ex post) on executive action that is weakened when the executive can 
dissolve the legislature or in the face of executive proposal authority; removeleg 
weakens the effect of a formal legislative veto and clears potential obstacles to 
presidential proposals; execindep is weakened where the legislature can remove the 
executive and reduces total vetoes where the independent executive also can dissolve 
the legislature; at the same time, by contrast, it strengthens the effect of presidential 
proposal power; legpres reduces the potential for checks where the president can call 
new elections, but is an authority that can be checked de facto when the legislature can 
remove the executive; and legpm is counted as meaningless where the prime minister is 
a sitting member of the legislature.  
Table 1 about here 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of all the variables employed in the analysis (see 
Table 1 for data definitions and sources). Our legchecks indicator is available over the 
period 1984-2005. It ranges from 3.3333 to 12.333 with a mean value of 7.8155. 
Countries with very weak institutional checks in our sample include Finland, Qatar, 
Hungary and Libya. At the top end Latin American countries, like the Dominican 
Republic, Colombia, Chile and Brazil have very strong checks. This contrasts with the 
sample of countries with very weak or strong checks according to the CHECKS AND 
POLCON measures over the same period. To appreciate this in Table 2 we list countries 
representing maximum or minimum values according to the three indicators. This table 
shows that country orderings changes across different measures of checks. The 
differences between the three indicators become clear when looking at the (statistically 
significant) simple correlations between each: legchecks-CHECKS, 0.0635; legchecks 
and POLCON, 0.0963; CHECKS-POLCON, 0.4135 (see Table 2 in the Appendix). 
Clearly the three indicators are measuring checks in different ways with the largest 
differences between legchecks and the other two, as expected.  
Table 2 about here 
To measure corruption we draw from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) as 
published by the Political Risk Services Group and the World Governance Indicators 
(WGI) from the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2006). The ICRG corruption measure 
captures in-house experts perceptions of actual or potential corruption in the form of 
excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party funding, 
and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. The measure ranges from 0 to 
6 and higher values reflect a lower perceived risk of corruption or, in other words, 
perceptions that the government is cleaner. Alternatively, the World Bank’s Control of 
Corruption indicator draws from numerous perception-based sources, including the 
ICRG, and reflects the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by 
elites and private interests. This measure varies from -2.5 to +2.5 and higher values 
indicate stronger control of corruption. The ICRG measure is available since 1984 while 
the World Bank measure was first published for 1996. It is for this reason that we 
mostly rely on the ICRG measure in our empirical analysis and employ the World Bank 
measure for robustness purposes. According to the ICRG, the risk of corruption is 
lowest in countries like, Germany, Switzerland, Norway, Luxembourg and Canada and 
highest in Liberia, Bangladesh, Haiti, Paraguay, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
 
We estimate the following model,  
 
Control of Corruptionit = α1 + α2legchecksit + α 3 Xit + Uit 
 
Where legchecks represents our chosen measure of institutional or formal checks, X is a 
vector of control variables and U is the error term. Given our previous discussion we 
expect α2 < 0 or, in other words, that the presence of stronger formal checks should 
worsen corruption. This model is estimated by way of OLS with panel corrected 
standard errors as recommended by Beck and Katz (1995) in the presence of 
substantially more cross-section units than time periods (in our sample, N=97 and 
T=21). We employ a Period SUR (seemingly unrelated regression) which computes 
standard errors that are robust for between-period correlation (cross-section clustering). 
We eschew cross-section fixed effects because it relies exclusively on the variation 
within each cross-section something which is very limited in our legchecks variable.
4
 
On the other hand, in some of our regressions we do employ period fixed effects to take 
into account the influence of unknown or unobservable factors evolving over time and 
affecting all our cross-section units.  
We take several precautions in an effort to ensure that the estimated impact of formal 
checks on corruption is not picking up the influence of rival political parties or partisan 
preferences in the legislative process. First, we follow Brown et al. (2011) and control 
for partisan preferences by way of the DPI variable “Polarization” that measures the 
maximum ideological difference (left-right-center orientation) between the chief 
executive’s party and the four largest parties of the legislature based on seat shares (see 
also, Keefer and Stasavage 2003).
5
 Second, we check the robustness of the estimated 
impact of legchecks in the presence of two alternative measures of veto points—the 
previously described POLCON variable from Henisz (2000; 2002) and CHECKS from 
the DPI—which incorporate information on both the number of checks and the extent of 
ideological polarization in their construction.   
In line with previous work on the determinants of corruption we include as well a 
number of standard control variables. We control for real GDP per capita and the size of 
government because wealthier countries tend to have better government quality, and a 
large public sector implies greater institutional capacity as well as greater scope for 
                                                          
4
 Although not shown in Table 1, the within country variation over time is very limited: the 
within standard deviation is 1.0192 (compared to a between deviation of 2.3234) which implies 
a coefficient of variation of 0.1304.   
5
 Specifically, polarization is a coded: zero if the executive’s party controls an absolute majority 
in the legislature or if elections are deemed “uncompetitive”; one if elected bodies only feature 
center–left or center–right representation among the largest parties and; two in states featuring a 
large left and right wing presence among elected officials. 
diverting public funds.
6 
We control for ethno-linguistic fractionalization on the strength 
of the possibility that voters are more likely to support corrupt politicians from their 
own ethnic group on the expectation that co-ethnic public officials will, in turn, use the 
state to benefit them (La Porta el al. 1999; Glaeser and Saks 2006; Kimenyi 2006). 
We also control for the level of democracy, since democracy is likely to reduce 
corruption by tightening principal agent relationships. First, it increases the likelihood 
of alternation in office of political parties or—in polities with dominant political 
parties—of individual leaders within parties (Montinola and Jackman 2002). Second, it 
strengthens incentives of political elites to reveal information on malfeasance by 
opponents (Treisman 2000). Moreover, we consider the possibility of a quadratic 
relationship between democracy and corruption in line with Bäck and Hadenius (2008), 
who have suggested that the control of public officials is lowest at intermediate levels of 
democracies, higher in the context of dictatorships because of top-down hierarchical 
control and highest in developed democracies because bottom-up control in the guise of 
press freedoms and higher electoral participation. We follow these authors and account 
for democracy by way of the Polity IV DEMOC measure (Marshall et al. 2010).  
The capacity of voters to discipline malfeasant politicians also might depend on the 
electoral rules in place (see Persson et al. 2003; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005; 
Chang and Golden 2006). With this in mind, we account for the presence of plurality or 
majoritarian electoral rules because of the expectation that in such systems, under-
performing politicians can be more easily and severely punished than under 
proportional representation (Persson et al. 2003; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005). 
Moreover, we control for the size of voting districts since larger districts may either 
reduce corruption because they reduce barriers to entry faced by aspiring office holders 
(Persson et al. 2003) or increase it because individual political candidates facing 
intraparty competition are more tempted to use illegal proceeds to fund their electoral 
campaigns (Chang and Golden 2006). To account for the impact of electoral rules we 
draw from the DPI and employ a measure of the mean district magnitude in the house or 
parliament as well as a dummy variable which chooses for the presence of plurality 
rules. 
Finally, we control for the regime type by way of the SYSTEM variable from the DPI. 
This variable takes a value of 0 if the system can be characterized as presidential, 1 for 
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 For Islam and Montenegro (2002), economic development makes better-quality institutions 
more affordable, while La Porta et al. (1999) see it as creating a demand for better government. 
Treisman (2000) suggests that this may be a consequence of income’s positive effect on 
education, literacy, and depersonalized relationships. The importance of controlling for the size 
of public sector can be argued from both sides: Tanzi (1998) argues that a bigger public sector 
implies greater corruption due to the greater possibility for rents, but a larger public sector also 
could mean that governments are better endowed with resources, thereby potentially improving 
their performance. In relation to this, higher civil service pay has been found to reduce 
bureaucratic corruption (Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001).  
systems with an assembly-elected president and 2 for parliamentary systems. Some 
scholars have argued that presidentialism works against corruption because a president’s 
accountability to a national constituency strengthens principal-agent relations (Moe and 
Caldwell 1994; Persson et al. 1997; Shugart 1999). Alternatively, Kuniková and Rose-
Ackerman (2005) have suggested that corruption should be more prevalent in 
presidential than in parliamentary systems. First, they endow the president with 
relatively undivided power over sources of rents, thus clearing a path for the 
appropriation of public resources for personal gain. Second, and more importantly for 
our purposes here, strong presidential systems are characterized by fixed terms and 
restrictions in replacing a president mid-term (impeachment versus a no confidence vote 
in parliamentary systems), which, other things equal, should worsen the risk of 
malfeasance. This argument is very much in line with our take on the adverse impact of 
formal checks on the control of corruption. Indeed, because our measure comprises 
checks not only in the legislature proper but in the legislative process more generally, 
presidential systems like those in the Latin American cases listed above, with their 
additional institutional actor (the president) and constitutionally fixed terms of office 
where, for example, the legislature cannot be dissolved for disagreeing with the 
executive, score high. Thus, controlling for regime types allows us to control for the 
impact of presidential system on corruption by way of other channels distinct from 
those captured by our measure of formal checks.  
Empirical findings 
Table 3 represents our main findings based on the ICRG risk of corruption indicator 
(recall that higher values of this indicator reflect a lower perceived risk of corruption). 
Regressions 1 and 2 represent our base model and differ only insofar as regression 2 
also includes period fixed effects. The results are revealing. Our legchecks indicator is 
both negative, as predicted, and strongly statistically significant; its coefficient is 
substantively important as well. In sum, increasing the number and strength (in terms of 
veto players’ security) of formal legislative checks leads to higher levels of corruption, 
just as we hypothesize. This result is robust to controlling for the degree of political 
polarization which is associated with less corruption as expected (Brown et al. 2011). 
Focusing on regression 1, a one standard deviation increase in the strength of formal 
checks, increases corruption by 0.3429 points or 24.26 per cent of a standard deviation 
in the corruption indicator. Contrast this with the economic impact of polarization: 
based on the same regression, a one standard deviation increase in polarization reduces 
corruption by 0.1676 or 11.85 per cent of a standard deviation in this indicator.  
The estimated impact of institutional checks is moreover robust to controlling for the 
host of previously described control variables among which only GDP per capita and 
the level of democracy have a (positive) statistically significant impact. Neither the size 
of the public sector, nor the degree of ethnic heterogeneity nor the variable 
distinguishing between presidential and parliamentary systems, are statistically 
significant. Moreover, our estimates do not support the expectation that electoral rules 
may affect corruption (plurality rule and mean district magnitude). In relation to this, 
previous authors have indicated the desirability of accounting as well for whether open 
or closed lists are employed. Thus, Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005) have argued 
that close list proportional representation (PR) diminishes the individual accountability 
of politicians and thus should be associated with more corruption. Alternatively, Chang 
and Golden (2006) have suggested that close list PR systems reduce corruption because 
they push politicians to worry about the reputation of their party as a whole. When we 
do control for the presence of closed list PR systems (again by way of a measure from 
the DPI) we do not find it to have any effect in our sample and, more importantly, the 
estimated impact and statistical significance of legchecks does not change (results 
available upon request). 
Regressions 3 to 6 of Table 3 pursue the robustness of our base regression to different 
ways of controlling for the potentially confounding effect of democracy. In particular, in 
regression 3 and 4 we include a quadratic term for democracy and, consistent with Bäck 
and Hadenius (2008), find the existence of a J-shaped relationship between democracy 
and corruption: corruption is highest in the presence of intermediate levels of 
democracy, lower in countries with low levels of democracy and lowest in strong 
democracies. To further test if our results are being driven by the inclusion of non-
democratic countries in our sample, in regressions 5 and 6 we focus on a reduced 
sample of sixty-five democratic countries. We chose democracies by way of a dummy 
variable proposed by Cheibub et al. (2010) which classifies a country as a democracy if 
and only if the chief executive is chosen by popular election or by a body that was itself 
popularly elected, the legislature is popularly elected, there is more than one party 
competing in the elections, and an alternation in power under electoral rules identical to 
the ones that brought the incumbent to office has taken place. Despite the fact that our 
sample size is substantially reduced, our results our maintained and confirm the positive 
relationship between formal checks and corruption.  
Table 3 about here 
Table 4 pursues the robustness of these findings still further. Regressions 1 to 4 dwell 
on the need to control for the existence of partisan preferences across checks in an effort 
to isolate the impact of formal checks. In regressions 1 and 3 we substitute our 
indicators of formal checks and political polarization with the two indicators of checks 
which conflate the two. Whether we account for checks through the CHECKS variable 
from the DPI or the POLCON measure from Henisz (2000, 2002) we don’t find these to 
have a statistically significant impact on corruption. One reason why this may be the so 
is that, insofar as formal checks may increase corruption while checks relating partisan 
preferences reduce it, then indicators combining the two will not tend to have a clear 
effect. Perhaps more importantly, in regressions 2 and 4 we consider the robustness of 
our chosen indicator of formal checks in the presence of CHECKS and POLCON 
respectively. The fact that the estimated impact of legchecks remains negative and 
statistically significant at the highest level reinforces the finding that formal checks may 
be inimical to clean government.  
Table 4 about here 
The better is the information available to voters, the tighter should be the principle-
agent relationship between voters and politicians. Thus, while we argue that those most 
likely to observe malfeasance are other politicians or public officials, we also 
acknowledge the possibility that the freedom of the press can determine the extent to 
which any information on corruption can reach voters. Consequently, in the last two 
regressions of Table 4 we consider the impact of formal checks on corruption after 
accounting for both press freedom and newspaper circulation. Our press freedom 
indicator is provided by Reporters Sans Frontières and ranges from 0 to 100 with lower 
values indicating greater freedom for journalists and the media and stronger efforts 
made by governments to see that press freedom is respected (for a similar approach, see 
Brunetti and Weder 2003). In regression 5 we report that this indicator is negatively 
associated with control of corruption meaning that more press freedom will tend to lead 
to cleaner government as expected. The importance of the media is reinforced when, 
instead, we measure the strength of the press by way of daily newspaper circulation (per 
1000 people) in regression 6 (see also, Adserà et al. 2003). Formal checks continue to 
undermine good government even after controlling for press freedom. 
Table 5 about here 
In the first 4 regressions of Table 5 we employ our alternative measure of corruption 
from the World Governance Indicators. Recall that higher values of this measure imply 
greater perceived control of corruption and thus, it lends itself to an interpretation 
similar to that provided by the ICRG measure. Our results again support the expectation 
that the presence of formal checks is inimical to clean government. This result is 
maintained if we restrict our sample to democracies (regression 3) or, alternatively, 
control for the impact of alternative measures of checks (regressions 4 and 5).  In the 
last two columns of Table 5 we re-estimate our base model but now based on a cross-
section sample taking mean values of each variable over the 1984-2005 period. Because 
our formal checks indicator is quite stable over time, adopting this approach allows us 
to account for the possibility that our panel results are being driven by repeated entries 
(see also Brown et al. 2011). As can be appreciated in regressions 5 and 6, our 
substantive results are robust to this approach.  
Conclusion 
The principal-agent perspective highlights corruption as a component of agency loss. 
Where the principal is the voting public, corrupt agents use public resources for their 
own ends. The less accountable agents are, whether because it is difficult to specify 
clearly what they are expected to achieve in office, because the link between agent 
actions and outcomes is tenuous, or because effective monitoring of agents is 
prohibitively costly, the more corrupt they can be. Most scholarship on corruption 
builds on this observation to focus on, on one hand, voters’ ability to hold officials 
accountable and, on the other hand, the role of political competition as measured 
through the existence of partisan checks in limiting agents’ discretion to act on their 
own behalf. 
We build on this characterization of corruption as a principal-agent problem and hone in 
on the role of elites. Elites are sine qua non both for corruption and for control thereof. 
The key observation is that it is elites who are in a position to be corrupt, by virtue of 
their influence over the disposition of state resources, it is elites who are in a position to 
observe corruption, and it is elites who are in a position to report or block bad behavior 
if they so desire. But, and here is where we part from the literature, we take exception to 
the often-implicit assumption that the offices that define agenda influence matter only 
insofar as they are controlled by agents of rival parties—or, in the terminology of the 
literature, that institutional checks are inconsequential in the absence of partisan checks.  
Instead, we argue that checks always matter. How they matter, however, depends on 
whether they are controlled by allies or rivals. Outcomes (i.e., corruption) are a function 
of both institutions and preferences (Plott 1991, 904-905; and see Hinich and Munger 
1997, 17): when institutions are controlled by rivals, i.e., when they effectively 
comprise partisan checks, veto players check each other; when institutions are 
controlled by allies, by contrast, veto players collude. All else equal, agenda power 
provides those who wield it with the wherewithal to direct public resources to private 
ends. Whether they do so depends in no small measure on whether agenda power shared 
and, if it is, how misdirecting public resources affects those who share it. In short, the 
multiplication of institutional checks increases opportunities for corruption, but 
populating those checks with political rivals mitigates their effect. 
We test our claimed link between checks and corruption using a measure of checks that 
explicitly counts formal, institutional checks independent from partisan considerations. 
The measure accounts for both the number of formal checks and the extent to which 
these can be weakened by the legislative and constitutional provisions in place. Our 
results, using a sample 97 countries over the period from 1984 to 2005, strongly support 
our claimed link between checks and corruption. Formal checks are associated to 
increased corruption even after controlling for the independent effect of partisan checks 
as well as a host of additional explanatory variables that can impinge on the principal-
agent relationship and, as a result, might potentially confound our estimates. 
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Tables to be embedded in the text 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
  
Mean 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum 
 
Std, Dev, 
 
No. Obs. 
Control of Corruption- ICRG 3.4304 6.0000 0.0000 1.4139 1252 
Control of Corruption - WBGI 0.1790 2.5856 -1.7297 1.0871 521 
Institutional Checks 7.8155 12.333 3.3333 2.5786 1252 
Polarization 0.6765 2.0000 0.0000 0.9012 1252 
GDP per capita 12408 47626 249.48 11139 1252 
Government Size 17.27 62.06 2.01 6.82 1252 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.3997 0.9302 0.0020 0.2638 1252 
Democracy 6.7636 10.00 0.00 3.5861 1252 
Plurality 0.6605 1.0000 0.0000 0.4737 1252 
District magnitude 10.5858 150.00 0.72 21.1452 1252 
Regime Type 0.8802 2.0000 0.0000 0.9605 1252 
Checks 3.3643 18.000 1.000 1.803 1249 
Political constraints 0.3402 0.7200 0.0000 0.1839 1252 
Press Freedom Index 20.127 89.330 0.500 17.726 288 
Newspaper circulation 154.26 590.77 0.59 150.87 307 
Notes: WGI refers to the World Governance Indicators and ICRG to the International Country Risk Guide.  
 
  
Table 2. Measuring checks over 1984-2005 
Indicator 
(Source) 
Instchecks 
(Branduse and Heller 2013) 
CHECKS 
(DPI) 
POLCON 
(Henisz 2000; 2002) 
 
Maximum 
values  
(from highest to 
lowest) 
Brazil India Belgium 
Chile Papua New Guinea Netherlands 
Colombia France  Papua New Guinea 
Dominican Republic Denmark Switzerland 
Bolivia Ireland Japan 
Indonesia Czech Republic Israel 
USA Netherlands Finland 
 
Minimum values  
(from lowest to 
highest) 
Libya Bahrain Azerbaijan 
Hungary Brunei Bahrain 
Qatar Myanmar Brunei 
Finland China Myanmar 
Kuwait Cuba Cameroon 
Malawi Equatorial Guinea China 
Saudi Arabia Ethiopia Cuba 
Table 3. Panel Estimates (1984-2005): Dependent variable is Corruption (ICRG)  
 Full Sample  Democracies 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
Institutional Checks -0.133 
(0.032)*** 
-0.154 
(0.030)*** 
-0.125 
(0.032)*** 
-0.146 
(0.030)*** 
-0.131 
(0.043)*** 
-0.164 
(0.038)*** 
Polarization  0.186 
(0.084)** 
0.204 
(0.077)*** 
0.160 
(0.084)* 
0.177 
(0.076)** 
0.154 
(0.086)* 
0.175 
(0.074)** 
GDP per capita 0.437 
(0.086)*** 
0.459 
(0.081)*** 
0.365 
(0.092)*** 
0.388 
(0.087)*** 
0.499 
(0.130)*** 
0.542 
(0.118)*** 
Government Size 0.344 
(0.955) 
-0.437 
(0.884) 
0.310 
(0.943) 
-0.464 
(0.870) 
-0.156 
(1.219) 
-0.686 
(1.077) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.027 
(0.351) 
0.221 
(0.333) 
0.012 
(0.346) 
0.205 
(0.329) 
-0.182 
(0.423) 
0.200 
(0.391) 
Democracy 0.096 
(0.026)*** 
0.101 
(0.024)*** 
-0.075 
(0.084) 
-0.068 
(0.078) 
0.222 
(0.064)*** 
0.229 
(0.057)*** 
Democracy^2    0.018 
(0.009)** 
0.018 
(0.008)** 
  
Plurality  0.018 
(0.174) 
0.025 
(0.163) 
0.036 
(0.172) 
0.042 
(0.161) 
0.085 
(0.197) 
0.098 
(0.177) 
District magnitude 0.003 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Regime Type 0.069 
(0.111) 
-0.021 
(0.104) 
0.044 
(0.110) 
-0.045 
(0.104) 
-0.061 
(0.141) 
-0.183 
(0.127) 
Constant -0.353 
(0.835) 
-0.284 
(0.786) 
0.340 
(0.891) 
0.398 
(0.840) 
-1.811 
(1.050) 
-1.916 
(0.945)** 
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.60 0.50 0.61 0.53 0.66 
Period Effects N Y N Y N Y 
Number of Observations 1252 1252 1252 1252 877 877 
Number of Countries 97 97 97 97 65 65 
Notes: All estimations are OLS with (Period SUR) panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively.  
 
  
  
Table 4. Panel Estimates (1984-2005): Dependent variable is Corruption (ICRG)  
 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
Institutional Checks  -0.152 
(0.030)*** 
 -0.151 
(0.030)*** 
-0.110 
(0.041)*** 
-0.157 
(0.044)*** 
Polarization   0.223 
(0.082)*** 
 0.209 
(0.077)*** 
0.391 
(0.113)*** 
0.373 
(0.108)*** 
Checks -0.026 
(0.040) 
-0.025 
(0.038) 
    
Political constraints   -0.641 
(0.447) 
-0.375 
(0.408) 
  
GDP per capita 0.437 
(0.088)*** 
0.454 
(0.081)*** 
0.432 
(0.087)*** 
0.453 
(0.081)*** 
0.404 
(0.096)*** 
0.406 
(0.123)*** 
Government Size -0.150 
(0.984) 
-0.465 
(0.883) 
-0.337 
(0.980) 
-0.556 
(0.884) 
-0.696 
(1.146) 
-0.307 
(1.059) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.232 
(0.373) 
0.233 
(0.334) 
0.210 
(0.369) 
0.214 
(0.332) 
0.287 
(0.406) 
0.700 
(0.464) 
Democracy 0.101 
(0.028)*** 
0.105 
(0.025)*** 
0.117 
(0.029)*** 
0.113 
(0.027)*** 
-0.004 
(0.035) 
0.071 
(0.034)** 
Plurality  -0.057 
(0.177) 
0.036 
(0.164) 
-0.057 
(0.176) 
0.028 
(0.163) 
0.240 
(0.206) 
0.196 
(0.200) 
District magnitude 0.003 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
Regime Type 0.255 
(0.104)** 
-0.008 
(0.107) 
0.246 
(0.101)** 
-0.015 
(0.104) 
0.061 
(0.136) 
0.231 
(0.146) 
Press Freedom Index      -0.015 
(0.006)** 
 
Newspaper circulation       0.003 
(0.001)*** 
Constant -1.318 
(0.859) 
-0.233 
(0.787) 
-1.215 
(0.851) 
-0.209 
(0.785) 
-0.226 
(0.997) 
-0.439 
(1.042) 
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.60 0.55 0.60 0.50 0.57 
Period Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of Observations 1249 1249 1252 1252 288 307 
Number of Countries 97 97 97 97 84 67 
Notes: All estimations are OLS with (Period SUR) panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively.  
  
 
 
 
 
 Table 5. Panel and Cross Section Estimates   
 
 
 
(1) 
WBGI 
 
(2) 
WBGI 
 
(3) 
WBGI 
 
(4) 
WBGI 
 
(5) 
WBGI 
CS 
(6) 
ICRG 
CS 
(7) 
WBGI 
Institutional Checks -0.086 
(0.030)*** 
-0.080 
(0.029)*** 
-0.113 
(0.035)*** 
-0.082 
(0.030)*** 
-0.085 
(0.030)*** 
-0.151 
(0.032)*** 
-0.088 
(0.024)*** 
Polarization  0.188 
(0.071)*** 
0.149 
(0.070)** 
0.214 
(0.067)*** 
0.209 
(0.074)*** 
0.191 
(0.071)*** 
0.721 
(0.151)*** 
0.437 
(0.124)*** 
Checks    -0.030 
(0.034) 
   
Political constraints     -0.264 
(0.346) 
  
GDP per capita 0.551 
(0.072)*** 
0.476 
(0.076)*** 
0.579 
(0.097)*** 
0.541 
(0.072)*** 
0.548 
(0.071)*** 
0.327 
(0.093)*** 
0.400 
(0.066)*** 
Government Size -1.685 
(0.722)** 
-1.724 
(0.705)** 
-1.431 
(0.786)* 
-1.733 
(0.720)** 
-1.753 
(0.720)** 
-1.269 
(1.017) 
-1.932 
(0.730)*** 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.220 
(0.298) 
0.207 
(0.291) 
0.113 
(0.327) 
0.240 
(0.299) 
0.227 
(0.297) 
0.461 
(0.426) 
0.078 
(0.300) 
Democracy 0.037 
(0.021)*** 
-0.132 
(0.071)* 
0.194 
(0.055)*** 
0.042 
(0.022)* 
0.045 
(0.024)* 
0.054 
(0.035) 
0.041 
(0.026) 
Democracy^2   0.018 
(0.007)** 
     
Plurality  0.016 
(0.147) 
-0.025 
(0.144) 
0.190 
(0.151) 
0.028 
(0.147) 
0.011 
(0.146) 
0.119 
(0.171) 
0.046 
(0.149) 
District magnitude 0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.002)* 
-0.003 
(0.001)** 
Regime Type 0.102 
(0.097) 
0.084 
(0.095) 
-0.098 
(0.108) 
0.122 
(0.100) 
0.107 
(0.097) 
0.082 
(0.116) 
0.149 
(0.086)* 
Constant -4.251 
(0.682)*** 
-3.488 
(0.736)*** 
-5.675 
(0.781)*** 
-4.172 
(0.683)*** 
-4.199 
(0.680)*** 
0.622 
(1.050) 
-2.966 
(0.718)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.70 0.75 0.69 0.69 0.60 0.70 
Period Effects Y Y Y Y Y   
Number of Observations 521 521 350 520 521 101 101 
Number of Countries 90 90 60 90 90 101 101 
Notes: Regressions 1 to 5 are OLS with (Period SUR) panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. Regressions 6 
and 7 are OLS with White heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively.  
 
Appendix A. Data definitions and sources  
Control of Corruption- ICRG Assessment of corruption within the political system. Lower values imply a 
higher level of corruption (International Country Risk Guide, Political Risk 
Services Group).  
Control of Corruption - WBGI Assessment of corruption within the political system. Lower values imply a 
higher level of corruption (World Governance Indicators, World Bank).  
Institutional Checks Formal institutional checks in the political system. Higher values imply more 
formal checks (Branduse and Heller 2013).  
Polarization The maximum ideological difference (left-right-center orientation) between the 
chief executive’s party and the four largest parties of the legislature based on seat 
shares (Beck et al. 2011). 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in PPP and constant $ (World Development Indicators, World 
Bank). 
Government Size Government consumption as a percentage of GDP at current PPPs (Penn World 
Tables, Version 8.0). 
Ethnic Fractionalization The probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population, belong 
to different ethnic groups (Alesina et al. 2003).  
Democracy Institutionalized democracy from the Polity IV data set (Marhall et al. 2010). 
Plurality Dummy variable. 1 if plurality is used as electoral rule to select any candidate in 
any house (Beck et al. 2011). 
District magnitude Mean district magnitude in the House (Beck et al. 2011).  
Regime Type Takes a value of 0 if a regime can be characterized as presidential, 1 for systems 
with an assembly-elected president and 2 for parliamentary systems (Beck et al. 
2011). 
Checks Starts off with a value of one and rises with competitiveness of executive 
elections, the existence of additional legislative chambers, divided government, 
the number of coalition parties or inter-party ideological distance (Beck et al. 
2011). 
Political constraints The number of independent branches of government with veto power over policy 
change, the extent of party alignment across branches of government and the 
degree of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch (Henisz (2000; 
2002). 
Press Freedom Index Ranges from 0 to 100 with lower values indicating greater freedom for 
journalists and the media and stronger efforts made by governments to see that 
press freedom is respected (Reporters Sans Frontières).  
Newspaper circulation Daily newspaper circulation per 1000 people (World Development Indicators, 
World Bank).   
Appendix B. Correlation matrix 
 
Control 
Corruption 
ICRG 
Control 
Corruption 
WBGI 
Institutional 
Checks 
Polarization 
 
GDP per 
capita 
Government 
Size 
Ethnic 
Fractional. 
Democracy 
 
Plurality 
 
District 
magnitude 
Regime 
Type 
Checks 
 
Political 
constraints 
Control of 
Corruption- ICRG  1.0000              
Control of 
Corruption- WBGI 0.8056 1.0000            
Institutional Checks -0.2776 -0.1670  1.0000           
Polarization 
  0.3800  0.4556  0.1692  1.0000          
GDP per capita 
  0.6445  0.8618 -0.1882  0.4246  1.0000         
Government  
Size  0.0732 -0.0455 -0.0645  0.1274 -0.0798  1.0000        
Ethnic 
Fractionalization -0.4104 -0.4963  0.0444 -0.3747 -0.5155 -0.0443  1.0000       
Democracy 
  0.5400  0.5532 -0.0096  0.5090  0.5315  0.0590 -0.4916  1.0000      
Plurality 
 -0.1948 -0.1726 -0.0665 -0.4394 -0.1669 -0.0497  0.1893 -0.3131  1.0000     
District  
magnitude  0.0702 -0.0461 -0.0581  0.0961 -0.0188  0.1350  0.0358  0.0106 -0.3127  1.0000    
Regime  
Type  0.5255  0.6089 -0.4701  0.2365  0.6285  0.1317 -0.4447  0.4942 -0.0947  0.0516  1.0000   
Checks 
  0.3100  0.2975  0.0635  0.5443  0.3501  0.0267 -0.2829  0.5539 -0.1444 -0.0301  0.3930  1.0000  
Political constraints 
0.3104 0.3295 0.0963 0.3979 0.3119 -0.0603 -0.3229 0.6618 -0.2405 0.0983 0.2971 0.4135 1.0000 
 
 
